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David Schneiderman†
Contributing to democratic malaise in operative democracies are transnational constitution-like commitments, such as those found in international investment law. Among its constraints, citizens are legally discouraged from initiating
policy innovations that will upset investment expectations. Yet, one of the great virtues of democratic society, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, is the capacity of
people to change their minds: an ability to repair mistakes. Though the threat of
continual legislative innovation resulted in costly instability, it served as a catalyst
for an energetic public and private life. So as to tame the threat of intemperate
change, Tocqueville looked to the guiding hand of lawyers and judges—the functional equivalent of an aristocracy—to moderate majoritarian excess. International
investment lawyers have lost sight of the equilibrium that Tocqueville envisaged,
privileging legal disciplines over the ability of democratic polities to experiment
and innovate. For Tocqueville, democratic life would be intolerable and citizens
reduced to a “herd of timid and industrious animals” if too many constraints were
placed upon legislative energy. This Essay brings Tocqueville’s lessons to bear on
the field of international investment law. It pleads for a reduction in the influence
of lawyers and their legal strictures, beyond those constraints contained in national constitutional systems, on democratic practice.

INTRODUCTION
Political sociologist Claus Offe has diagnosed the participatory
deficit in North Atlantic democracies as the product of an imbalance in state–market relations. When the market is supreme, public policy can do little to constrain the market’s ever-expanding
realms. When taxing and spending are off the agenda, Offe
claims, “democratic politics [becomes] largely a pointless activity.”1 Among the strategies for reversing democratic malaise, he
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notes well before the election of President Donald Trump, is the
rise of authoritarian populism premised on strengthening borders and protecting populations from the threat of foreign “others.” Populists of this sort “are the only political agents in the
decades since 1990 who have managed to broaden their political
base and enhance participation.”2
While there undoubtedly are innumerable contributing factors to democratic backsliding in operative democracies in the
North Atlantic, principal among them is the shrinking policy
space associated with the spread of neoliberal legality. If neoliberal thought has had some difficulty identifying stable boundaries between states and markets,3 it also has been dedicated to
shrinking state policy space. Driven by anxieties associated with
rent seeking, means are sought to tame state action beyond extant constitutional constraints. Jurists have today taken up a
question that also preoccupied Alexis de Tocqueville: What constraints, other than national constitutional ones, are available to
limit majoritarian politics?4
At the urging of legal advisors, states have turned to regimes like international investment law in order to attain this
end. This is the transnational legal order made up of over 3,330
bilateral investment treaties, together with a number of regional
trade and investment agreements, intended to protect foreign
investors from adverse economic consequences. In this Essay, I
argue that such regime efforts have contributed to the decline of
democratic constitutionalism—paradoxically, in the name of
constitutional values like stability, predictability, and the rule of
law. It was to this end that the World Bank in 1997 promoted
strategies of precommitment. The World Bank defined “arbitrary” government as exhibiting, among its other faults, “unpredictable, ad hoc regulations and taxes.”5 The World Bank aimed
to contain the penchant for constant legislative changes that
sank the confidence of the owners of capital.6 Replacing defective
national legal systems with international adjudication was the
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proposed solution.7 The World Bank therefore recommended
strategies from which it would be expensive to exit:
Clearly, sovereign countries can still reverse course . . . by
withdrawing from such agreements. But they then have to
calculate not just the benefits and costs of the policy reversal, but also the broader costs of reneging on an international commitment for which their partners will hold them
accountable. The threat of international censure makes
countries less likely to reverse course.8
Exemplary of this strategy has been the global take-up of bilateral investment treaties that commit states to voluntarily
cabin their regulatory capacity. Treaty disciplines reinforce the
view that states have little more to do in regard to economic subjects other than to get out of the way of markets. If Professor
Mark Tushnet described the “new constitutional order” as one
that condones extensive regulation but “chasten[s] the most aggressive forms of regulation,”9 the regime I am describing renders even nonextreme forms of regulation susceptible to a claim
for monetary damages. Citizens, as a consequence, disengage
and consign the control of such subjects to legal elites who are
better suited, citizens are told, to steer state policy. In this way, legal elites and the institutions that they control serve constitutionlike functions by limiting the capacity of citizens and states to
pursue their preferred policy objectives.10 They “help[ ] governments” resist “recalcitrant domestic economic and political lobbies” by imposing “external discipline,” Professor Thomas
Wälde declares.11 This disempowerment of citizens in North
Atlantic democracies contributes to the malaise that tolerates
democratic backsliding.
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The analysis that follows is guided by lessons learned from
Tocqueville’s first volume of Democracy in America.12 One of
Tocqueville’s lessons is that among the great virtues of democratic society is the capacity to make “repairable mistakes.”13
Another of Tocqueville’s lessons is that the guiding hand of lawyers and judges can serve to moderate majoritarian excess.14
Tocqueville envisaged both features as essential to democracy’s
durability. He did not intend to bifurcate these two essential
features of democratic society. Democracy promotion, however,
has not been a priority for new transnational legal norms and
institutions.15 International investment lawyers and arbitrators,
instead, have succeeded in bifurcating Tocqueville. It is rule by
lawyers in transnational arenas that is preferred over democratically authorized decisionmaking. This results in excessive constitutional oversight, the problem at which this Essay takes aim.
I argue that operative democracies should rejoin these two
sides of Tocqueville and diminish the influence of investmentlaw norm entrepreneurs. These advocates aim to “universalise
their preferences” of privatization, limited states, and open borders.16 As they go about performing their drafting, interpretive, and adjudicative functions—functions that they genuinely believe they are best suited to perform—they aim to
establish a different kind of equilibrium, one in which states
are reprimanded for undermining investors’ expectations.17 So as
to reinvigorate democratic experience and mitigate democratic
backsliding, this Essay calls for less transnational constitutional
oversight in economic domains and more reliance on alreadyexisting constitutional settlements. If we are to take seriously
the “dangerous adventure[ ]” that is democratic existence and
that so inspired Tocqueville,18 we must necessarily render the
12 Further references are to Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Library
of America 2004) (Arthur Goldhammer, trans) (“Tocqueville (2004)”). Occasionally, references are to Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Chicago 2000) (Harvey C.
Mansfield and Delba Winthrop, trans) (“Tocqueville (2000)”), and to Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America (Oxford 1946) (Henry Reeve, trans) (“Tocqueville (1946)”).
13 Tocqueville (2000) at 222 (cited in note 12).
14 See id at 251–58.
15 See Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy
and the Critique of Ideology 91 (Oxford 2000).
16 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, in
Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law 219, 235 (Hart 2011).
17 They, after all, expect to be “justly rewarded for their astute risk-taking” according to Wolfgang Streeck, The Crisis in Context: Democratic Capitalism and Its Contradictions, in Armin Schäfer and Wolfgang Streeck, eds, Politics in the Age of Austerity
262, 266 (Polity 2013).
18 Tocqueville (2004) at 280 (cited in note 12).
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investment-law bar, indifferent to the checks and balances of
national constitutional orders, less influential in determining
the proper limits of state capacity.19
This might be viewed as a difficult argument to make for a
number of reasons. The first is the difficulty of trying to piece
together the meandering and often contradictory argument that
Tocqueville makes in Democracy in America.20 It is also awkward to invoke, in defense of the mutability of democratic practice, an early nineteenth-century French aristocrat who described himself as being “in the grip of a kind of religious terror”
when confronted with American democratic life.21 A related difficulty is the value that Tocqueville placed on law and lawyers,
whose roles are elevated in investment law and whose influence
I propose be diminished.22 What Tocqueville maintained, and
what should not be overlooked, is the reciprocal influence of democracy on the ways of lawyers. Neither exclusively determined
democratic outcomes.23 Even if he considered “mixed government” (or what in England was called the “balanced constitution”) as a “chimera,” Tocqueville was in search of constitutional
equilibrium.24
For this reason, constitutions alone were insufficient to
check majority tyranny.25 The US Constitution was only one
19 For more on arbitrator preferences, see generally Gus Van Harten, Sovereign
Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment Treaty Arbitration
(Oxford 2013).
20 See Jon Elster, Alexis de Tocqueville: The First Social Scientist 2 (Cambridge
2009) (describing Tocqueville’s “constant ambiguity, vagueness of language, tendency to
speculative flights of fancy, and self-contradictions”). See also James T. Schleifer, The
Making of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America 212–23 (North Carolina 1980).
21 Tocqueville (2004) at 6 (cited in note 12).
22 Tocqueville’s famous quip about the inevitable legalization of politics speaks to
that influence. See Tocqueville (2004) at 310 (cited in note 12) (“There is virtually no political question in the United States that does not sooner or later resolve itself into a judicial question.”). See also id at 111.
23 Tocqueville tended to think “in contrasting pairs, or pairs in tension.” James T.
Schleifer, Tocqueville’s Democracy in America Reconsidered, in Cheryl B. Welch, ed, The
Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville 121, 123 (Cambridge 2006). See also Pierre Manent,
Democratic Man, Aristocratic Man, and Man Simply: Some Remarks on an Equivocation
in Tocqueville’s Thought, 27 Persp Polit Sci 79, 80 (1998) (Daniel J. Mahoney and Paul
Seaton, trans) (discussing Tocqueville’s pairing of democracy and aristocracy); Claude
Lefort, Writing: The Political Test 37 (Duke 2000) (David Ames Curtis, ed and trans)
(“Tocqueville is a master in the art of contrast.”); Arthur Kaledin, Tocqueville and His
America: A Darker Horizon 247 (Yale 2011) (“A random reading of nearly any paragraph
or sequence . . . reveals an elaborate system of balances.”).
24 Tocqueville (2004) at 289 (cited in note 12). Tocqueville describes this as an “admixture of lawyer-like sobriety with the democratic principle.” Tocqueville (1946) at 203
(cited in note 12).
25 See Harvey C. Mansfield, Tocqueville: A Very Short Introduction 41 (Oxford 2010).
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element contributing to the country’s democratic makeup. The
“success of the experiment” for Tocqueville depended on other
elements like mores and traditions that were “not . . . designed
by constitutional provisions.”26 So it was the conjoined effects—
the “admixture”27—of democracy and legality that rendered democracy sustainable in the long run. After all, citizens of democratic states must have the ability, Tocqueville insisted, of committing errors that can be corrected.
Finally, it might be said that international investment law
does not prevent democratic polities from making repairable
mistakes; rather, states need only pay damages in order to exercise that privilege. This reply not only misses the value of democracy’s “ceaseless agitation” that energizes civil society28—it
also underestimates the gravity of a threat of a claim for damages. As the World Bank observed, the “threat of international
censure makes countries less likely to reverse course.”29 If the
World Bank is correct, a threat of costly damages, on top of international censure, is more likely to dampen experimentation.30
In spite of these risks, the argument gives rise to an opportunity to bring to bear the insights of an innovative comparative
constitutionalist on a cognate field of law. It also offers up the
possibility of asking investment lawyers and arbitrators to consider how well their enterprise holds up to the thought of an icon
of the liberal tradition. I surmise that it does not hold up very
well.
This Essay proceeds as follows. First, I discuss Tocqueville’s
descriptive and normative account of democratic practice in
Jacksonian America, contrasting instability in the land of equality with the role played by lawyers serving quasi-aristocratic
functions. I turn subsequently, in Part II, to a discussion of international investment law as a regime of neoliberal legality
that is intended to reduce policy space, rendering policy changes
26 Sheldon S. Wolin, Archaism, Modernity, and Democracy in America, in Sheldon
S. Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution 66, 72–73
(Johns Hopkins 1989). See also Tocqueville (2004) at 284 (cited in note 12) (“Custom has
accomplished even more than law.”); id at 291 (“[T]he reasons for the mildness of government must be sought in circumstances and mores rather than in the laws.”).
27 Tocqueville (1946) at 203 (cited in note 12). See also Tocqueville (2004) at 36 (cited in note 12).
28 Tocqueville (2004) at 279 (cited in note 12).
29 World Development Report 1997 at 101 (cited in note 5).
30 See, for example, Gus Van Harten and Dayna Nadine Scott, Investment Treaties
and the Internal Vetting of Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study from Canada, 7 J Intl
Dispute Settlement 92, 93 (2016) (finding that “[g]overnment ministries have changed
their decision-making to account for trade concerns including ISDS”).
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and reversals costly. In Part III, I consider how attentive high
courts in North America have been to constitutional excess in
transnational legal realms. It turns out they are not so good at
recognizing transnational legal effects on national constitutional
space.
I. DEMOCRATIC ADVENTURES
Tocqueville understood well the capacity of a democratic
polity, despite its dangers, to maintain a sustainable equilibrium of societal forces.31 What Tocqueville observed in early
nineteenth-century America was a democratic community “agitated by an ill-defined excitement and by a kind of feverish impatience, that engender[s] a multitude of innovations, almost all
of which are attended with expense.”32 “[W]hen public power is
in the hands of the people . . . [t]he improving spirit bends itself
to a thousand different purposes,” he observed.33 Those “improvements [ ] cannot be had for free, for the goal is to improve
the lot of the poor man, who cannot help himself.”34 Tocqueville,
therefore, expressed concern that this form of government was
“costly” and “expensive.”35 Nevertheless, its “superabundant
force” and “energy” were among the real advantages of democracy.36 Its benefits spilled over into civil society, generating material
improvement and spreading prosperity.37 Even if the majority
could pursue its “capricious propensities in the formation of the
laws,”38 the majority could always reflect on legislative choices
31 See Jon Elster, Political Psychology 101–02 (Cambridge 1993) (“Although
Tocqueville points to some possible sources of instability in democratic societies, his central assumption is very clearly that the America he had observed around 1830 was in
stable equilibrium.”); Elster, Alexis de Tocqueville at 95–104 (cited in note 20) (discussing Tocqueville’s theories regarding social equilibrium in American democracy).
32 Tocqueville (1946) at 153 (cited in note 12). It was the prevalence of everchanging “secondary laws” that prompted Tocqueville’s observations about repairable
mistakes. These are in contrast to the “generating principles of the laws,” by which he
must have meant the law of the Constitution. As to the ever-changing secondary laws,
Tocqueville mentions “three stout volumes” enacted by the state of Massachusetts legislature since 1780. See Tocqueville (2004) at 286 n 2 (cited in note 12). I discuss some of
the costly legal innovations that Tocqueville had in mind below. See text accompanying
notes 49–57.
33 Tocqueville (2004) at 241 (cited in note 12).
34 Id.
35 Id at 241–42.
36 Tocqueville (1946) at 180 (cited in note 12).
37 See Tocqueville (2004) at 279–80 (cited in note 12). A life accustomed to agitation
and change is a quality “equally needed for success in commerce.” Alexis de Tocqueville,
Journeys to England and Ireland 116 (Faber & Faber 1958) (J.P. Mayer, ed, and George
Lawrence and K.P. Mayer, trans).
38 Tocqueville (1946) at 186 (cited in note 12).
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and change its mind. This was one of the true advantages of
democracy: the ability to repair mistakes. The “great privilege of
the Americans is not only to be more enlightened,” wrote
Tocqueville, “but also to enjoy the faculty of committing errors
that can be corrected.”39
Being a novice in US affairs, Tocqueville relied heavily on
local informants. Among them was the young Cincinnati lawyer
and Federalist (and later Chief Justice of the US Supreme
Court) Salmon P. Chase, who privately expressed misgivings
about the American experiment in mass democracy. It had the
disadvantage of responding to redistributive demands of the
unpropertied, Chase lamented.40 In his 1831 meeting with
Tocqueville, Chase admitted that America had “carried democracy . . . to its ultimate limits,” resulting in “very bad choices.”41
In conversation the next day with the young Whig lawyer
Timothy Walker,42 Tocqueville asked, “Are the laws changed often?” “Incessantly,” replied Walker, “That is one of the greatest
disadvantages of our democracy.”43 Based on these conversations, Tocqueville, in his notebooks, described democracy in Ohio
as being “without limits,” giving “an impression of prosperity,
but not of stability.”44 It was this instability—this “ceaseless agitation”45—that so unsettled Tocqueville. It also held out the most
promise, he wrote in Democracy in America. This “superabundant strength, an energy that never exists without it, and
which, if circumstances are even slightly favorable, can accomplish miracles.”46
39 Tocqueville (2004) at 258 (cited in note 12). For differing translations of the
French text, see Tocqueville (2000) at 216 (cited in note 12); Tocqueville (1946) at
165 (cited in note 12). For the original, see Alexis de Tocqueville, De la Démocratie
en Amérique 339 (Librairie Nouvelle 1874) (“le faculté de faire des fautes réparables”).
Tocqueville appears to be following Montesquieu’s observation about the government of
England. See Montesquieu, Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans
and Their Decline 88 (Hackett 1999) (David Lowenthal, trans) (“In a word, a free government—that is, a government constantly subject to agitation—cannot last if it is not
capable of being corrected by its own laws.”).
40 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America 92 (Yale 1960) (J.P. Mayer, ed,
and George Lawrence, trans).
41 Id.
42 For an account of Walker’s career, see generally Gordon A. Christenson, A Tale
of Two Lawyers in Antebellum Cincinnati: Timothy Walker’s Last Conversation with
Salmon P. Chase, 71 U Cin L Rev 457 (2003).
43 Tocqueville, Journey to America at 98 (cited in note 40).
44 Id at 262.
45 Tocqueville (2004) at 279 (cited in note 12).
46 Id at 281. See also Letter from Tocqueville to Ernest de Chabrol (9 June 1831), in
Alexis de Tocqueville, Letters from America 68 (Yale 2010) (Frederick Brown, ed and
trans); Tocqueville, Journey to America at 182–83 (cited in note 40).

2018]

Against Constitutional Excess

593

In this vein, Tocqueville asked: Does Ohio “prosper because
of democracy or despite of it?”47 The answer is provided in the
subsequent paragraphs of his notebooks, in which he discusses
the differences between Ohio, a free state, and Kentucky, a slave
state situated just across the Ohio River. The economy languished in Kentucky, lacking the energy and vitality of its
neighbor to the North. “[N]othing shows more clearly,” he concluded contra Montesquieu, “that human prosperity depends
much more on the institutions and the will of man than on the
external circumstances that surround him.”48
Tocqueville complained, nevertheless, that the mutability of
laws in America “encourages democratic instability in every way
possible.”49 “America is the one [country] in which the duration
of laws is the shortest,”50 he declared, “allow[ing] [it] to follow its
capricious propensities.”51 Yet it turns out that Ohio’s laws did
not change as rapidly as Tocqueville was led to believe. Laws
that were repealed were often replaced by substantially similar,
though more comprehensive, legislation. Of thirty acts passed by
the Ohio legislature in the 1820–1821 session, twenty were repealed by 1834. Upon further examination, repeal of laws having to do with such diverse subjects as divorce and alimony, incorporation of religious societies, and gaming and billiard tables
were often improvements on older versions.52 To be sure, there
were some reversals, but these turn out not to have been predominant.53 Even if Chase privately expressed concerns about
extension of the franchise in his conversation with Tocqueville,
in the “preliminary sketch” to his three-volume The Statutes of

47

Tocqueville, Journey to America at 263 (cited in note 40).
Id at 264. Sheldon S. Wolin observes that Tocqueville omitted to mention this
connection—made in his notebooks—between Ohio’s nonslave status and its “radical
democracy,” in Democracy in America. See Sheldon S. Wolin, Tocqueville between Two
Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life 136–37 (Princeton 2001).
49 Tocqueville (2004) at 286 (cited in note 12).
50 Id.
51 Tocqueville (2007) at 208 (cited in note 12).
52 I am grateful to Kyle Gooch, Georgetown University Law Center Class of 2009,
for compiling these findings at my request, based on a study of Salmon P. Chase, ed, 1
The Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern Territory: Adopted or Enacted from 1788 to
1833 Inclusive (Corey & Fairbank 1833).
53 An anonymous reviewer in the United States Democratic Review, October 1837,
rightly complained that “[i]n points of minor importance, our laws are no doubt [ ] altered, though not more frequently than those of other nations.” Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America, 659, 662 (Norton 2007). James Bryce, speaking of the book as a
whole, captured such flaws in saying that Tocqueville’s “analysis is always right so far as
it is qualitative, sometimes wrong where it attempts to be quantitative.” James Bryce,
Studies in History and Jurisprudence 327 (Oxford 1901).
48
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Ohio, Chase characterized the “unlimited extension of the elective franchise” as having produced not “any evil” but a “safe and
sufficient check upon injurious legislation.”54 Contributing to
this opinion was the ban on slavery in the Northwest Ordinance,
which ensured that the “great doctrine of equal rights” would
generate “good government” and “wise legislation.”55
In other words, democracy was made sustainable by placing
public power in the hands of the people. There was further value
to majoritarian politics. Compliance with democratic outcomes
will be honored, Tocqueville observed, because losing political
forces are expected to have the opportunity of securing a majority in subsequent elections: “[A]ll parties are prepared to recognize the rights of the majority, because all hope some day to exercise those rights.”56 Majorities, therefore, were respected, with
few obstacles to impede their progress—a “state of affairs,” he
worried that is “dire and spell[s] danger for the future.”57
If no one, in theory, is excluded from democratic practice,
then the “tyranny of the majority” continually was a threat, particularly at the level of states.58 Democracy spelled danger unless mechanisms were present to check its mismanagement.
Such mechanisms, for Tocqueville, were expected to be “functional equivalents or stand-ins for aristocracy.”59 Aristocratic
traces could be found dwelling in the lawyerly class. The “conservative and antidemocratic”60 element of the legal profession
ensured that judges and lawyers could serve as “a strong opposition to the revolutionary spirit and the unthinking passions of
democracy.”61 Few laws escaped judicial review, observed
Tocqueville, “for there are very few laws that are not adverse to
some person’s interest and that litigants cannot or should not
invoke before the courts.”62 This conferred an immense power on
54 Chase, 1 The Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern Territory at 48 (cited in
note 52).
55 Id. As Frederick J. Blue notes, Chase ignored the prevalence of Black Codes in
Ohio. See Frederick J. Blue, Salmon P. Chase, First Historian of the Old Northwest, 98
Ohio Hist 52, 66 (1989).
56 Tocqueville (2004) at 285 (cited in note 12). See also Stephen Holmes, Tocqueville
and Democracy, in David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, eds, The Idea of
Democracy 23, 30 (Cambridge 1993).
57 Tocqueville (2004) at 285 (cited in note 12).
58 See Tocqueville (2004) at 175 (cited in note 12) (observing that the “business of
the Union is infinitely better conducted than that of any of the states”).
59 Wolin, Tocqueville between Two Worlds at 159 (cited in note 48).
60 Tocqueville (2004) at 305 (cited in note 12).
61 Id at 303.
62 Id at 115. These comments anticipated A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of
the Law of the Constitution 338 (Macmillan 3d ed 1889).
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the judicial branch in “pointing out the faults of the legislator.”63
“Confined within proper limits,” Tocqueville maintained, “the
power granted to American courts to pronounce on the unconstitutionality of laws still constitutes one of the most powerful barriers ever erected against the tyranny of political assemblies.”64
The legal profession offered another prophylactic to majoritarian excess. Although Tocqueville had occasion to speak disparagingly of lawyers,65 they valued order and formalities. Their
“spirit will be eminently conservative and anti-democratic,” as
they will have acquired the “tastes and the habits of aristocracy.”66 In a letter to his friend, Ernest de Chabrol, Tocqueville described lawyers as forming the “resistance”—they are the “stayput class.”67 Yet they “serve the people’s cause”68 and so function
as a connective tissue—a “natural liaison”69—between the aristocratic and the democratic elements. Tocqueville’s paean to the
legal profession concludes by describing how the power of lawyers “envelops the whole of society, worms its way into each of
the constituent classes, works on the society in secret, influences
it constantly without its knowledge, and in the end shapes it to
its own desires.”70
Democratic excess was curbed institutionally by a jury system that enabled citizens to learn about governing affairs not
exclusively in their own interest.71 The people learn the “ideas
63

Tocqueville (2004) at 116 (cited in note 12).
Id. But see Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 156 (Hafner 1949) (Thomas
Nugent, trans) (originally published 1748) (characterizing judicial power as “in some
measure, next to nothing”).
65 See Tocqueville (2004) at 305 (cited in note 12) (noting the ease with which
lawyers may be turned into “most useful instruments of royal authority”); Alexis de
Tocqueville, 1 The Old Regime and the Revolution 258 (Chicago 1998) (François Furet
and Françoise Mélonio, eds, and Alan S. Kahan, trans) (originally published 1856) (observing that “[a]longside a ruler who is violating the law, it is very rare not to see a lawyer”). For an excellent discussion of this paradox, see generally Harold L. Levy, Lawyers’
Spirit and Democratic Liberty: Tocqueville on Lawyers, Jurors, and the Whole People, in
Peter Augustine Lawler and Joseph Alulis, eds, Tocqueville’s Defense of Human Liberty:
Current Essays 243 (Garland 1993).
66 Id at 304–05.
67 Letter dated June 20, 1831, in Tocqueville, Letters at 81 (cited in note 46). Yet he
also describes lawyers as “supplely bend[ing] to the exigencies of the times and surrender[ing] without resistance” to public opinion. Tocqueville (2004) at 311 (cited in note 12).
68 Tocqueville (2000) at 254 (cited in note 12).
69 Tocqueville (2004) at 306 (cited in note 12).
70 Id at 311.
71 See id at 331 (arguing that the jury system, along with federalism, a vibrant associational life, and judicial power, curbed the excesses of America’s democratic system).
See also Schleifer, The Making at 248–49, 256 (cited in note 20) (discussing Tocqueville’s
analysis of the “enlightened self-interest” of American democracy that fosters in citizens
an ability “to sacrifice a portion of their personal interests in order to save the rest”).
64
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and language of the courts,” and thus “the language of the judiciary becomes the vulgar tongue.”72 So much so that the “legal
spirit, born in law schools and courtrooms, gradually spreads
beyond their walls.”73 It eventually “infiltrates all of society, . . .
filtering down to the lowest ranks, with the result that in the
end all the people acquire some of the habits and tastes of the
magistrate.”74 Juries were the “most effective means of teaching
the people how to rule,” Tocqueville insisted.75 The jury system
performed functions similar to individual property rights—if felt
by all, the matter at hand could be understood by all.76 If democracy did not ensure the best government, Tocqueville admitted,
it was the best means of enabling citizens to learn from their
mistakes.
Political theorists, inspired by Tocqueville’s account, have
been preoccupied with filling out the contours of contemporary
democratic practice that were only inchoate in the early nineteenth century. Aside from the separation of powers, they have
not been all that interested, however, in theorizing about law
and the role of lawyers in curbing democratic excess.77 The philosopher Claude Lefort, for instance, describes Tocqueville as
having articulated democracy’s “prime virtue” as its “ceaseless
agitation which . . . influences all social intercourse” and not its
ability to provide the best government.78 Tocqueville’s work provides no “better description . . . of the democratic adventure,” declares Lefort.79 In his work on democratic transitions, Professor
Adam Przeworski similarly maintains that democracy is sustainable so long as it exhibits a “ruled open-endedness, or organized uncertainty.”80 When political forces are offered the
72

Tocqueville (2004) at 310–11 (cited in note 12).
Id at 311.
74 Id.
75 Id at 318.
76 See Tocqueville (2004) at 273 (cited in note 12).
77 See Paul Carrese, The Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of
Judicial Activism 213 (Chicago 2003) (noting that “little attention is paid” to Tocqueville’s
“emphasis upon the role of lawyers and judges”). An unusual exception in the English
language is Levy, Lawyers’ Spirit (cited in note 65).
78 Claude Lefort, Reversibility: Political Freedom and the Freedom of the Individual, in Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory 165, 168 (Polity 1988) (David
Macey, trans).
79 Id at 169. The value of democratic experimentation helps to explain Lefort’s famous portrayal of the “locus of power” as being an “empty place.” Claude Lefort, The
Question of Democracy, in Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory 9, 17 (Polity
1988) (David Macey, trans).
80 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms
in Eastern Europe and Latin America 13 (Cambridge 1991).
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opportunity to “advance their interests in the future,” present
defeats will be tolerated.81 For this reason, we should celebrate
uncertainty as a “conspicuous characteristic” of democratic
practice.82
With markets inhibiting democratic openness, there is much
less to celebrate. Proponents of neoliberal reason exploit this
malaise, observes Przeworski and his coauthors, even as they
underestimate the role of democratically authorized institutions
in facilitating public and private life.83 Because the neoliberal
path to economic improvement necessarily produces winners and
losers, it generates disequilibrium,84 deepening social inequality
across regions and states.85 This “combination of an increasing
inequality with a reduced sovereignty is likely to exacerbate social conflicts and weaken” democratic institutions86—precisely
the point Offe makes about democratic decline in an age of austerity, which introduced this Essay.87
II. TRANSNATIONAL BRAKES
In this Part, I take up international investment law as a
species of transnational legal regulation, authored by states
and administered by a cadre of international economic lawyers,
as an example of the limits, internalized by states, that dampen democratic possibilities. It is not that investment arbitration
has shown no interest in democratic theory. In Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States (“Tecmed”),88 the
tribunal relied on the reasoning in James v The United
Kingdom,89 concluding, as did the European Court of Human
Rights, that foreigners are not well represented in host-state political processes. Foreign investors are disenfranchised from
participating in decisions that give rise to reversals in policy,
the tribunal declared, “partly because the investors are not
81

Id at 19.
Albert O. Hirschman, Notes on Consolidating Democracy in Latin America, in
Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays 176, 179 (Viking 1986) (translating the title of Przeworksi’s paper from Portuguese as “Love Uncertainty and You Will
Be Democratic”).
83 Adam Przeworski, et al, Sustainable Democracy 12 (Cambridge 1995).
84 See Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System 16
(Verso 2016); Wolfgang Streeck, Comment on Wolfgang Merkel, “Is Capitalism Compatible with Democracy?”, in Streeck, How Will Capitalism End? 185, 192 (cited in note 84).
85 See Streeck, How Will Capitalism End? at 9 (cited in note 84).
86 Przeworski, et al, Sustainable Democracy at 10 (cited in note 83).
87 See generally Offe, Participatory Inequality (cited in note 1).
88 43 Intl Legal Mat 133 (ICSID 2004).
89 App No 8793/79, *26–28 (ECtHR 1986).
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entitle [sic] to exercise political rights reserved to the nationals
of the State.”90
Business firms, of course, do not have a vote, and there remain other means by which they can make their preferences
known to political actors.91 Whatever passing interest tribunals
have expressed in democratic theory mostly provides cover for
the solicitude conferred upon foreign investors.92 This is borne
out by Professor Gus Van Harten’s content analysis of 162 arbitral awards. “[W]here elections or democracy were mentioned by
arbitrators,” he finds, “it was often to suggest that politics had
contributed to unsound decisions and that the arbitrators’ role
was to ensure that investors were compensated.”93 Arbitrators,
for the most part, appear more comfortable with disparaging
politics so that democracy is, in Professor Sheldon Wolin’s
words, “managed without appearing to be suppressed.”94
This element of distrust of public authority in investment
arbitral opinions underscores a desire to have democratic governments get out of the way of the movement of capital. There is
little tolerance for democratic experimentation or reversals of
course. This is a regime that warrants to foreign investors that,
given its capacious standards of protection, their interests will
be vindicated in the cases in which uncertainty in state policy
results in a significant diminution in the value of their investments. The regime sees it as being to no one’s advantage that
democracies can reverse course, especially because reversals can
give rise to a claim for damages.
The manner in which investment law operates to undercut
democratically authorized decisionmaking is exemplified by the incorporation of the “legitimate expectations” doctrine into “fair and
equitable” treatment (FET). As Professor Muthucumaraswamy

90 Tecmed, 43 Intl Legal Mat at 164 at ¶ 122. I have addressed this in David
Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy? Political Process and International Investment
Law, 60 U Toronto L J 909, 915–21 (2010).
91 See Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy? at 931–40 (cited in note 90).
92 It was this same tribunal, after all, that declared that host states cannot undermine the “basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to
make the investment.” Tecmed, 43 Intl Legal Mat at 173–74 at ¶ 154. For more discussion, see notes 96–103 and accompanying text.
93 Van Harten, Sovereign Choices at 73 (cited in note 19). Van Harten undertakes
detailed content analysis of most publicly available investment arbitration disputes from
2010 to 2011. An explanation of his methodology can be found in Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 Osgoode Hall L J 211 (2012).
94 Sheldon S. Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter
of Inverted Totalitarianism 47 (Princeton 2008).
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Sornarajah notes, there was no expectation, when the “vacuous
concept” of FET was incorporated into treaty practice, that
states would be expected to freeze regulatory frameworks or pay
damages for the privilege of doing so.95 It was a doctrine seldom
recognized in the national laws of contracting states and was,
instead, “conjured” up by arbitrators “through a mystical process.”96 Nevertheless, F.A. Mann presciently foresaw this development in his 1981 study of the FET clause in the British model
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Admitting that, “[a]lthough
these are very familiar terms [referring to FET], they have hardly ever been judicially considered.” Mann anticipated contemporary trends, opining that the language of “unfair and inequitable
treatment is a much wider conception” than arbitrary, discriminatory, and abusive treatment and “may readily include [ ] administrative measures in the field of taxation, licenses and so
forth.”97
A doctrine of legitimate expectations, it was anticipated,
could serve purposes similar to a “stabilization clause” in naturalresource concession contracts.98 Such contractual clauses carried
with them a commitment to investors that existing laws and
regulations would be frozen at the time of the concession or, alternatively, that the concessionaire would be exempt from adverse legal changes. The bargain was that the host state could
expect to receive negotiated royalty rates in return for legal stability over the life of an investment.99 While such commitments
could be enforced via commercial arbitration, so-called umbrella
clauses in BITs have had the effect of internationalizing contracts so that they are enforceable before investment tribunals
as if they were included in expressly within the terms of the international treaty.100
While tribunals have accepted arguments that FET mandates that changes of policy that upset express or implied
95 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment 350 (Cambridge 3d
ed 2010). For information on the origins of FET, see generally Martins Paparinskis, The
International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment (Oxford 2013).
96 M. Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment 263 (Cambridge 2015).
97 F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52
British Yearbook Intl L 241, 243 (1981).
98 Thomas W. Waelde and George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law versus Contract Interpretation, 31 Tex Intl L J 215, 245 (1996).
99 See id at 220–24.
100 See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 153–62 (Oxford 2008). See also James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 Arb Intl 351, 366–70 (2008).
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commitments attract compensation, some states have gone so
far as to include such commitments in their BITs. For example,
the 1998 Italy-Mozambique BIT provides that:
Whenever, after the date when the investment has been
made, a modification should take place in laws, regulations, acts or measures of economic policies governing directly or indirectly the investment, the same treatment
shall apply upon request of the investor that was applicable to it at the moment when the investment was agreed
upon to be carried out.101
Professor Tarcisio Gazzini describes these commitments as “the
treaty equivalent of the most robust form of stabilization provisions, the so-called ‘freezing clauses.’” 102
Though many examples could be drawn from the arbitral
record, the decision of the panel in the BG Group Public Limited
Company v Argentine Republic103 case is taken up as it exemplifies the manner in which investment law delimits policy space.104
BG owned a 45 percent share of a formerly public gas distribution company, having an exclusive license to deliver natural
gas to the environs of the city of Buenos Aires.105 The licensing
regime ensured that tariffs collected by the company would be
recouped in US dollars, adjusted periodically, converted into pesos at the time of billing, and reviewed every five years.106 The
Argentine economic meltdown of 2000 to 2001 precipitated a variety of measures for societal self-protection, including the abolition of dollarization and, due to the ensuing devaluation of the
peso, a refusal to convert tariffs into US dollars. This was a response, Argentina argued, “to a general crisis . . . aimed at
maintaining the sustainability of the economy.”107 Rather than
“facilitating . . . the unjust enrichment of certain groups and the

101 Agreement between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government
of the Republic of Mozambique on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Art 12(3) (Dec 14, 1998), archived at http://perma.cc/59AQ-QR6E.
102 Tarcisio Gazzini, Beware of Freezing Clauses in International Investment Agreements (Columbia FDI Perspectives No 191, Jan 16, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/C7C6-JJAW.
103 UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Tribunal, Final Award in the Matter of an UNCITRAL Arbitration (Dec 24, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/V4CD-FGTM.
104 Id. The immobilizing effects of other disputes arising out of the Argentine economic crisis are discussed in David Schneiderman, Resisting Economic Globalization:
Critical Theory and International Investment Law 40–51 (Palgrave Macmillan 2015).
105 See BG Group *11–12 at ¶¶ 23–24 (cited in note 103).
106 See id *13 at ¶¶ 29–32.
107 Id *89 at ¶ 283.
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resulting poverty of others,” all participants in the economy
were expected to share in the burden of responding to the economic collapse.108
BG, together with other foreign investors, were not willing
to share in this burden and so, in April 2003, filed a dispute invoking a 1990 Argentina–United Kingdom Bilateral Investment
Treaty. The company claimed that it had a “guarantee[d]” rate
of return on its investment regardless of the financial hardships
being experienced by Argentinians.109 Argentina “lured investors
like BG into investing . . . by representing to them that the investment would be governed by a stable tariff regime, which
would guarantee them a reasonable real-dollar income,” the UK
investor claimed.110 There were no contractual commitments to
enforce. Instead, the investor sought to hold the state to commitments made via legislation and licensing.
Having taken measures at “odds with the stability and predictability” of the legal order,111 the Argentinian government’s
action precipitated a total collapse in the value of the investment (an estimated worth of over US $238 million).112 This, the
company claimed, amounted to an indirect expropriation of the
company’s assets without compensation, an “unreasonable
measure[ ]” impairing the use of the investment that also offended FET.113 I focus here on this last argument that Argentina
failed to provide to the claimant a “stable and predictable investment environment in accordance with its legitimate and
reasonable expectations” as part of its FET obligations.114
The Government responded with a variety of arguments,
among them that the regulatory framework in place at the time
the investment was made “offer[ed] no guarantees.”115 Central to
the Argentinian defense were arguments defending the capacity
of states and citizens to change policy direction in order to accommodate fiscal exigencies. Argentina, in other words, should
be free to take measures for societal self-protection, and no
public utilities license or investment treaty could be interpreted as

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id *91 at ¶ 288.
BG Group *87–88 at ¶ 280 (cited in note 103).
Id.
Id *88 at ¶ 282.
Id *125 at ¶ 415.
BG Group *125 at ¶ 413 (cited in note 103).
Id *86 at ¶ 276. See also id *103 at ¶ 333.
Id *90 at ¶ 286.
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freezing that regulatory environment. This particularly is the case
when no stabilization clause is included in the relevant BIT.116
The tribunal declined to follow Argentina’s logic and accepted BG’s claim that the company was denied FET. The company,
after all, had invested in Argentina on the basis that the state
would guarantee the stability of its investment interest.117 There
has been virtual unanimity on the question of liability among
tribunals considering claims arising out of the Argentinian economic crisis.118 Most every tribunal, including the BG Group tribunal, concluded that Argentina breached the requirement of
FET by revamping the legal framework, thereby diminishing
expected rates of return for investors.119 Having “entirely altered
the legal and business environment by taking a series of radical
measures,” Argentina entirely undermined investor expectations,
the tribunal ruled.120 This had the effect of violating “the principles of stability and predictability inherent to the standard of fair
and equitable treatment”—the reasonably-to-be-expected “stable
and predictable business and legal investment environment.”121
Argentina was ordered to pay BG over US $185 million.122
The tribunal resisted the proposition that this finding resulted in the “freezing of the legal system.”123 Instead, as the
tribunal unsatisfyingly put it, “in order to adapt to changing
economic, political and legal circumstances the State’s regulatory
power still remains in place.”124 The regulatory regime generated
“specific commitments” that the state was obliged to honor.125
116

See id *90 at ¶ 287.
See BG Group *97 at ¶ 307 (cited in note 103).
118 For a representative sample, see CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentine Republic,
44 Intl Legal Mat 1205, 1231–32 at ¶¶ 239–46, 1234–36 at ¶¶ 266–81, 1237–38 at
¶¶ 296–303 (ICSID 2005) (holding Argentina liable for breach of FET obligations); Enron
Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/01/3, *74 at ¶ 231, *85
at ¶ 268, *88 at ¶ 277 (May 22, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/ZM47-9FUD (holding
Argentina liable for the same treaty breach); Sempra Energy International v Argentine
Republic, ICSID ARB/02/16, *78 at ¶ 268, *90 at ¶ 304, *93 at ¶ 314 (Sept 28, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/H4D6-LQMF (also holding Argentina liable for this treaty
breach).
119 See José E. Alvarez and Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime *12 (Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper 2008/5), archived at http://perma.cc/9NMY-S6L8;
David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 Nw J Intl L & Bus 383, 387–88 (2010).
120 BG Group *97 at ¶ 307 (cited in note 103).
121 Id *97–98 at ¶¶ 307, 310.
122 Id *136 at ¶ 457.
123 Id *93–94 at ¶ 298.
124 BG Group *93–94 at ¶ 298 (cited in note 103).
125 Id *96 at ¶ 305. See also id *105 at ¶ 345.
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Freezing and then reducing the rate of return by converting
from US dollars to Argentinian pesos was not in keeping with
this form of commitment through legislation and licensing.
What policy space remained, in light of these specific commitments, is never made clear. As it turns out, this was precisely
the outcome intended by the US State Department when it
negotiated the BIT, argues Professor José Alvarez, who was employed there at the relevant time. Despite its “penchant for declaring national emergencies,” as a consequence of the ArgentineUS BIT, Argentina could no longer escape liability owed to foreign investors in the wake of future economic crises.126
Professor Moshe Hirsch explains that the legitimate expectations doctrine under FET allows for more regulatory flexibility
than many will admit. Regulatory changes that merely diminish
investment value “alone are insufficient” to give rise to liability.127 There must be, in addition, “exceptional factors,” he explains.128 Hirsch mentions only two examples that qualify as
“exceptional”—namely, abuse of authority and continual legislative change,129 neither of which well captures the Argentinian
case. Professors Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer similarly
acknowledge that something more than mere regulatory change
is needed to give rise to a violation of FET: “What matters is
whether measures exceed normal regulatory powers and fundamentally modify the regulatory framework for the investment
beyond an acceptable margin of change,” they conclude.130 What
is determinative, then, is whether the change is abnormal or
“exceptional.”131 The answer to this sort of question almost always
has been determined, as in the past, by powerful capital-exporting
states and their surrogates. Departures from their hegemonic
version of normality will not be tolerated.132
126 Alvarez and Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors at *33 (cited in
note 119). See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and Vivendi
Universal SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/03/17, *90 at ¶ 234 (July 30, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/RW7Q-CD7Q.
127 Moshe Hirsch, Between Fair and Equitable Treatment and Stabilization Clause:
Stable Legal Environment and Regulatory Change in International Investment Law, 12 J
World Investment & Trade 783, 784 (2011).
128 Id.
129 Id at 784, 800 (referring to the continuous legislative change as the “rollercoaster effect”).
130 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment
Law 148 (Oxford 2d ed 2012).
131 Hirsch, Between Fair and Equitable Treatment at 784, 800 (cited in note 127).
132 See Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Re-imagining the Global Economic Order 239 (Oxford 2011); Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 Harv L Rev 546, 549 (1987).
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III. LOCAL MISRECOGNITION
Recall that, for Tocqueville, lawyers and judges will be “eminently conservative and antidemocratic”—they are the “stayput class,” he believed.133 Curiously, they have, for the most part,
paid little heed to the disequilibrium produced by the investment treaty regime. Some high courts, as a consequence, have
failed to recognize the constitutional implications of outcomes
like the one in BG Group. Canadian courts, for instance, show a
marked reluctance to consider investment law as giving rise to
any significant implications for domestic constitutional law. This
is despite the fact that investment law’s legal disciplines “impose far stricter limits on Canadian governments than anything
in the [Canadian] Constitution.”134
A majority of the US Supreme Court disregarded such constitutional effects when undertaking judicial review of the tribunal decision in BG Group PLC v Republic of Argentina.135 At
issue before the Court were not the stabilization effects of BIT
commitments, but review of the tribunal’s decision to accept jurisdiction despite the treaty’s local litigation requirement.136 As
arbitrators have authority to determine a tribunal’s competence,
the tribunal permitted the investor to proceed immediately to
arbitration regardless of the Argentina-UK BIT requirement
that the claimant first seek a remedy in local Argentinian courts
for an eighteen-month period.137 The DC Circuit unanimously
vacated the award.138 The Supreme Court ruled otherwise, holding that the tribunal had not exceeded its jurisdiction.139
The investment tribunal warranted deference, wrote Justice
Stephen Breyer for the majority, because “[i]nternational arbitrators are likely more familiar than are judges with the expectations of foreign investors and recipient nations regarding the
operation of the [local remedy] provision.”140 In so doing, the

133 Tocqueville (2004) at 305 (cited in note 12); Tocqueville, Letters at 81 (cited in
note 46).
134 Harry Arthurs, Constitutional Courage, 49 McGill L J 1, 7 (2003). The NAFTA
constitutional challenge is discussed in David Schneiderman, Investor Rights and the
Judicial Denial of Neo-liberal Constitutionalism, in Simon Archer, Daniel Drache, and
Peer Zumbansen, eds, The Daunting Enterprise of the Law: Essays in Honour of Harry
W. Arthurs 169, 169–81 (McGill-Queen’s 2017).
135 134 S Ct 1198 (2014).
136 See id at 1203–04.
137 See BG Group *5–7 at ¶ 3 (cited in note 104).
138 See Republic of Argentina v BG Group PLC, 665 F3d 1363, 1366 (DC Cir 2012).
139 See BG Group, 134 S Ct at 1206.
140 Id at 1210.
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majority likened investment arbitration to private commercial
arbitration.141 The Court’s solicitude toward commercial arbitration is informed, in turn, by its deference toward labor arbitration outcomes. Only “deviat[ing] wildly from the contract” or the
absence of any “contract to arbitrate in the first place” warrant
judicial interference in labor disputes, the Court has held.142 Because labor arbitration is the “paradigm of private justice”143—“a
system of private law,” according to the Court—significant deference is appropriate.144 The unusual influence of labor arbitration on BG Group is made plain in Breyer’s subsequent book on
the role of global and comparative legal developments on the
Court’s work. Breyer compares the Court’s approach to investment arbitration to the review of labor arbitration awards under
US law.145 How labor arbitration can be likened to this contentious subfield of public international law is never well explained.
Equating judicial review of labor disputes with determinations of state regulatory capacity in a wide array of policy fields
looks like a category mistake.146 Chief Justice John Roberts, in
dissent with Justice Anthony Kennedy, took a different view:
the BIT’s local litigation requirement was a condition precedent
to an agreement to submit a claim to arbitration. There could be
no jurisdiction—no acceptance of the unilateral offer to consent
to arbitration—until this condition was satisfied.147 Roberts had
a better sense of the stakes involved. “It is no trifling matter,”
he declared, “for a sovereign nation to subject itself to suit by
private parties; we do not presume that any country—including
our own—takes that step lightly.”148
That the stakes are quite high is revealed by the fact that
former President Barack Obama, together with the US Trade
Representative (USTR), trumpeted parallels between investment
141

See id at 1206.
Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World: American Law and the New Global
Realities 186 (Alfred A. Knopf 2015). See also, for example, United Steelworkers of
America v American Manufacturing Co, 363 US 564, 568 (1960) (“The courts, therefore,
have no business weighing the merits of the grievance,” but rather are “confined to ascertaining whether . . . [the] claim . . . is governed by the contract.”).
143 Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 Yale L J 916,
916 (1979).
144 United Steelworkers of America v Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co, 363 US 574,
581 (1960).
145 See Breyer, The Court and the World at 179–92 (cited in note 142).
146 See Anthea Roberts and Christina Trahanas, Judicial Review of Investment
Treaty Awards: BG Group v Argentina, 108 Am J Intl L 750, 754 (2014) (“This approach
makes no sense.”).
147 See BG Group, 134 S Ct at 1216 (Roberts dissenting).
148 Id at 1219 (Roberts dissenting).
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treaty protections and rights available to citizens under the US
Constitution when seeking congressional authorization to complete the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (from which the
United States has now withdrawn). Given the breadth of investment treaty protections, they turn out even to exceed safeguards available to US citizens in the Bill of Rights.149 The majority of the Court seemed curiously disinterested in such
linkages. As Tocqueville reminds us, “when free to choose,
[lawyers] will not innovate.”150 If they can avoid it, they will not
want to be seen to be impeding the smooth movement of global
capital.
CONCLUSION
It seems that Tocqueville’s lesson—that democracy’s great
advantage is the ability to make repairable mistakes—has largely been lost on lawyers working within the subfield of international investment law. To be sure, there are tendencies operating in the other direction that are intended to restore
(“recalibrate” is the preferred term) some sort of equilibrium to
the system.151 Such efforts, however, mostly are modest and, even
then, resisted by many investment lawyers and arbitrators.152 National court judges, at times, rise to the occasion and resist unreasonable encroachments on policy space beyond that available in national constitutional orders.153 They are not
149 See David Schneiderman, ‘Writing the Rules of the Global Economy’: How America
Defines the Contours of International Investment Law *1–2 (unpublished manuscript,
2017) (on file with author).
150 Tocqueville (2004) at 310 (cited in note 12). Lawyers, Tocqueville acknowledged,
were reluctant to change civil law because they had a “direct interest in maintaining it
as it is, good or bad, for the simple reason that they are familiar with it.” Id at 51. This
was put in stronger terms in notes of his conversation with Albert Gallatin. Lawyers
have not revised the civil law, Gallatin advised, because “they defend the abuses and
ambiguities from which they profit.” Tocqueville, Journey to America at 21 (cited in note
40). We might conclude, then, that it is lawyers’ self-interest, and not merely conservative habits, that render them disinterested in change.
151 See generally José E. Alvarez, Why Are We “Re-calibrating” Our Investment
Treaties?, 4 World Arb & Mediation Rev 143 (2010).
152 See generally David Schneiderman, The Paranoid Style of Investment Lawyers
and Arbitrators: Investment Law Norm Entrepreneurs and Their Critics, in C.L. Lim, ed,
Alternative Visions of the International Law on Foreign Investment: Essays in Honour of
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah 131 (Cambridge 2016).
153 I have elsewhere discussed the Colombian Constitutional Court behaving in such
a fashion in Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization at 177–79 (cited
in note 10). A similar tension is identified by the Israeli High Court of Justice in the Gas
Outline Plan case. See The Movement for Quality Government v Prime Minister of Israel,
HC4374/15, 7588/15, 8747/15, 262/16 (Isr 2016). The English-language summary is archived at http://perma.cc/DN8C-3XDM.
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consistently reliable in this regard, however, as the North
American record suggests.
This bifurcation of Tocqueville by the legal profession
gives rise to concerns addressed at the end of the second volume of Democracy in America and taken up again in The Old
Regime and the Revolution. At the conclusion of his first work,
Tocqueville worried about a new kind of despotism that could
befall democratic societies. It would isolate individuals, reducing
them to children, he wrote. “Rather than tyrannize,” such a form
of despotism “inhibits, represses, saps, stifles, and stultifies, and
in the end [ ] reduces each nation to nothing but a flock of timid
and industrious animals, with the government as its shepherd.”154
In a famous passage in The Old Regime and the Revolution,
Tocqueville expanded on this dystopian vision. It was the very
essence of despotism, he declared, to spread the “love of profit”
and “material pleasure and comfort” above all else.155 He castigated “private interests, too given to looking out for themselves
alone.”156 Tocqueville considered eighteenth-century physiocrats
(and socialists157) as exhibiting a penchant for seizing “social
power” away from the people in order to “shape” the nation “in a
certain way.”158 For them, “it was for the state to form the citizen’s mind according to a particular model set out in advance.”159
The state’s “duty was to fill the citizen’s head with certain ideas
and to furnish his heart with certain feelings that it judged necessary.”160 This, for Tocqueville, amounted to “democratic despotism”: “Above society, a single official, charged with doing
everything in its name, without consulting it.”161 Have investment lawyers been leading citizens of democratic states in
these directions?
Neoliberal legality, I have argued, has helped to precipitate
a slide into democratic passivity. Excessive constitutional rights
conferred upon powerful economic actors and policed by transnational legal institutions exacerbate these tendencies, rendering
democratic politics a less meaningful means for expressing political preferences. International investment law, more particularly,
154
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156 Id.
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serves to constrain democratic capacity in operative democracies by conferring privileged access to foreign investors together with legal rights encapsulating the highest standards of protection known to international law. As Professor Jeremy
Waldron observes, “no such certainty is available in any other
realm of economic activity.”162 Citizens are reduced to debtors
jointly liable for the behavior of their states, and politics is emptied of the long-standing tension between democracy and markets.163 If determining the proper sphere of government intervention in economic subjects has long been the work of
democratic deliberation, such matters are unlikely to be permanently resolved by the investment-law regime. The tumult of
democratic life, which so inspired Tocqueville, ensures that, despite the regime’s constitutional aspirations, it will be, if not
short lived, the subject of continued political contestation.
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